



The meaning of formal semantics
Abstract: This paper considers some of the foundational issues of formal semantics.
These issues include the nature of the data that is to be accounted for, the nature of
the formalism used to characterise that data, and the criteria for determining whether
a particular formal account is adequate. If the relevant data is merely the arguments
and truth conditions that subjects agree with, then the terms in which the theory is
expressed may be irrelevant. But a case can be made that it is also legitimate to be
concerned with the intuitions that people have about how they reason with language,
as well as technical and philosophical issues relating to the chosen formalism. The
diversity of issues and objectives is highlighted by considering a selection of different
problem domains, and by questioning the sometimes implicit assumptions about what
counts as an appropriate formal framework. Ultimately the meaning of formal seman-
tics depends upon assumptions about the nature of the data that is to be accounted for,
and in what sense the formal theory itself needs to be sympathetic to that data.
Key words: Formal semantics, formalisation, set theory, model-theoretic analysis,
proof-theoretic analysis, ontology
0. Introduction
Those of us engaged in formal semantics are sometimes asked to justify
what it is that we do. In particular we may be questioned as to whether
what we are engaged in constitutes some form of testable, rigorous sci-
entific endeavour, or whether it is more about telling plausible sounding
stories about aspects of language for which we have stories to tell. If the
latter, then semanticists may be vulnerable to accusations of ignoring con-
founding data and issues, or failing to take seriously the need for some
objective criteria by which the proposed account can be evaluated, and
determined to be better or worse than some alternative account. In this
context it is worth considering, at an abstract level, the nature of theo-
ries that are proposed by formal semanticists, and the kinds of problem
domains in which they might be applied.
This paper develops some of the arguments presented by Fox and Turner (2012).
A typical semantic theory will seek to characterise some certain aspects
of meaning for a fragment of the language. Perhaps the most common
contemporary approach is to find a way of translating linguistic examples
into a set-theoretic representation, for which the rules of set theory itself
then mimic the behaviour of the linguistic examples in some sense.1 We
might describe this as the model-theoretic tradition, where any semantic
feature of the language is to be characterised as a set. In this setting, even a
relation between sets is just another set. The translation might be mediated
by a logical representation, but usually the set-theoretic model of this logic
is taken to be the “real” semantics.
We may question to what extent such characterisations constitute a se-
mantic theory: what do they tell us that is new or informative? Of course,
if we take an extensional view — a view which is consistent with the
set-theoretic approach — we could say that such theories themselves char-
acterise what it is to be a semantic theory. But rather than accept this
impredicative characterisation, we could break the circle and ask some
more reflective questions about this approach. For example, is it right to
conflate seemingly distinct notions by collapsing everything to sets? Fur-
thermore, if this is an empirical account, the question remains as to the
nature of the data that is being captured. In particular, the question arises
as to whether essential aspects of the data, or our intuitive understanding
of language, are being lost or overlooked by such characterisations.
Such questions can also be asked of other approaches and paradigms
besides the model-theoretic tradition, where for example various notion
are captured in terms of expressions in λ -calculus or some form of type
theory. In such cases, is it appropriate for distinct notions to be conflated
when formulated as λ -terms or as types?
1. Problem Domains
While it may be appropriate to consider formal semantic interpretation in-
dependent of any particular problem domain, it can be useful to consider
what role a formal semantic analysis might play in various contexts: differ-
ent issues can come to the fore in different domains. Here we considered
1A similar methodology can be adopted with frameworks other than set theory,
such as constructive type theory (see Ranta, 1994, for example).
text-based computer games, statue law, as well as plurals and mass terms.2
The first of these exemplifies a narrow, controlled domain, the second in-
volves the use of rigorous language, and the last exemplifies a general
linguistic phenomena that is not constrained to a particular field of use.
One early area for computer-based natural language “understanding”
was text-based “adventure games”.3 Such games provide a very clearly
defined domain, with a finite number of objects, places and actions, but
with a potentially unlimited number of commands and questions that can
be issued by the player. The problem is then how such commands and
questions can be interpreted mechanically. In contrast to other problem do-
mains, this provides a clear criteria for correctness, and relatively “clean”
data.4
In the case of the formal interpretation of statute law, some relevant
issues are whether it is possible to determine, mechanically, when the law
is being complied with, just by interpreting its language. Intuitively at
least, one would expect such laws to have a moderately clear criteria for
correctness of interpretation. In contrast to the adventure game problem,
the language used is complex, and the data to which the law is applied is
quite “messy” and unclear. At the very least, to determine whether a law
is being complied with, the relevant circumstances have to be described at
an appropriate level of abstraction.
More generally, those working in formal semantics are interested in cap-
turing certain universal aspects of language and its meaning. An example
of this is the interpretation of sentences with mass terms and plurals. In
such cases, the data is often complex and uncertain. It is not always clear
what entailments hold. We give three somewhat arbitrary examples to il-
lustrate the range of fundamental conceptual problems that can arise even
with what appears to be a relatively elementary linguistic notion.
2The areas described here illustrate a range of issues, but they are not intended to
be paradigm cases, or in any sense exhaustive.
3An early example of this genre is the “Colossal Cave Adventure” (Montfort,
2003, p10).
4The view that the domain is limited and straightforward might in part be based on
an understanding of how such games actually behave, which may limit expectations
about what is appropriate and reasonable given the constraints of the time. Players of
contemporary computer games might now expect more sophisticated language com-
prehension. Certainly, the language processing abilities of early text-based games
were rather primitive.
In the case of the sentence “Three men lifted two pianos”, we may
wonder how many people, pianos and lifting events were involved. For
the sentence “The water is dirty”, if we take “the water” to be defined
as referring to some salient collection of water molecules, and nothing
else, we may wonder in what sense such a collection of molecules can be
considered “dirty”. The statement “The cards are on top of each other”
can be used correctly to describe a stack of cards, even though the bottom
card is not on top of any other card (and there is no card on the top card).
There are many other problematic cases, but these are perhaps sufficient
to indicate that there are difficulties in giving highly reductive accounts of
meaning.5
The appropriate ontological structures for human reasoning can be
vague. For example, while we may know that material objects composed
of atoms, the meaning of language does not depend on such an understand-
ing of the nature of the physical world. In that sense at least, meaning and
the nature of our reasoning appear to be independent of scientific theories
of the world.
Accounts of plural and mass entities also highlight the question of
whether first-order theories are adequate. One structure proposed for
analysing such terms is a complete lattice (Link, 1982). Yet the axiom for
lattice-theoretic completeness is second-order in nature (requiring quan-
tification over collections of entities).
Such examples highlight the problem that the criteria for correctness are
uncertain and the data messy, even for apparently simple, single-sentence
examples. For this reason we may be forced to limit the scope of the
formal semantic analysis, and leave some aspects of meaning unanalysed.
2. Issues
Some salient issue for a formal account of meaning include the nature of
meaning, the nature of the data, the kinds of expressions (“speech acts”)
involved, and whether we are aiming for an implementation, a formal char-
acterisation, or an explanation.
We need to reflect on the kind of meaning we are seeking to formalise,
and whether it depends on the specific problem, or whether there is a gen-
eral notion of linguistic meaning common to such problems. If there is a
5These examples are discussed in more detail by Fox (2000).
coherent notion of linguistic meaning, we may also wonder to what extent
it can be characterised by a formal theory.
The data is more than just the language. For the adventure game, knowl-
edge of the game state is required. For statute law, knowledge of salient
parts of a process or procedure are required, together with knowledge of
how to formalise descriptive information at an appropriate level of abstrac-
tion. In the case of linguistic phenomena such as plurals and mass terms,
we seem to require some knowledge of folk ontology, and a way of dealing
with vague and incomplete meanings. In all cases, the data to be charac-
terised is some kind of abstraction, of both language and the world.
It is clear that there are a range of linguistic expressions other than
propositional assertions. For example, the adventure game requires an
analysis of imperatives and questions, and statute law, obligations and
permissions. It is possible that ultimately we may decide it appropriate
to have some propositional interpretation of these apparently distinct no-
tions.6 Even so, ontologically we still need the means to reflect on whether
this is an appropriate thing to do.
Semantic theories may have different intended uses. This may effect
what counts as an appropriate form of analysis. For the adventure game, it
is important to have an effective interpretation that supports an implemen-
tation. For statute law, we require an effective description that character-
ising the key aspects of the law. For linguistic puzzles, we might be more
interested in something that could be characterised as an “explanation”.
We may question whether these are really distinct (or even appropriate)
characterisations, and to what extent they may share some common ele-
ments.
The general objectives of the formal aspect of formal semantics can be
construed as having at least two related aspects. First, there is the eval-
uation of language, and linguistic expressions, in logic. This could be
achieved by using using a formal theory to give truth conditions for propo-
sitions, answerhood conditions for questions, and compliance conditions
for imperatives, for example. Second, formal semantics can capture struc-
tural patterns of entailment, seeking to mirror our intuitions about linguis-
6For example, Tichý (1978); Hamblin (1973); Karttunen (1977), and others, argue
that questions and propositions should be the same type and that any distinction re-
sides in our relationship to them. Similarly in the case if imperatives, some propose
reducing them to properties (Portner, 2005, for example).
tic reasoning, presuppositions, connotations, and formalising general rules
about when, and in what sense, one proposition, imperative, etc., follows
from another.
3. Formal Semantics
Contemporary formal semantic theories assume that a rigorous formal
analysis of at least some aspects of meaning is possible. Typically such
theories present, or at least assume the existence of a compositional trans-
lation.
Compositionality guarantees completeness of the coverage of the se-
mantic interpretation for sentences that are generated by the formal syn-
tax, or grammar. It is not necessarily a constraint on the nature of the
interpretation itself (Zadrozny, 1994) other than it not being completely
arbitrary.7 Perhaps the most rigorous version of such an analysis is the
“method of fragments” (Montague, 1970a,b, 1973; Partee, 2001) in which
the full details of the grammar and semantic analysis are spelt out for a
fragment of the language. In more recent work on formal semantics, such
an approach is often presupposed but with the details left unstated. There
is still an assumption that, in principle at least, the relevant part of lan-
guage can be given a rigorous grammatical characterisation, and that we
can give appropriate compositional rules of interpretation.
In order to make progress on a formal analysis, it has to be assumed that
there are some stable, core intuitions about meaning shared by a commu-
nity of language users. The common canonical core might not include all
aspects of meaning (cf. Section 1). There is also the issue of performance
vs. competence (de Saussure, 1916; Chomsky, 1965) which pervades the
analysis of language; our intuitions about what language “ought” to mean
may differ from actual practice. There is then a question about whether
our normative ideas about language are a genuinely reflection of the intrin-
sic nature of language itself — assuming that notion is coherent — and
whether, and in what sense, the formalisation of such norms corresponds
to the formalisation of linguistic meaning.
Concerning the way a theory is expressed, at a minimum the framework
in which meaning is to be formalised consists of a system of symbolic no-
tation and deterministic rules whose use and interpretation is understood
7See Westerståhl (1998) for a critical appraisal of these arguments.
by an appropriate community. To constitute a logic, as such, the formal
system ought to at least support notions of entailment and contradiction.
One key question concerns what features a logic must have in order to ad-
equately and faithfully capture appropriate aspects of meaning, and also
to express a compositional analysis without resorting to additional, extra-
logical machinery.8
Typically a logic will be characterised in terms of its proof theory (the
patterns of entailment that it supports), and a model theory (an interpreta-
tion of the symbols within some other formal framework). The behaviours
of the proof theory and model theory should be consistent with each other
(at a minimum, the model theory should not contradict the proof theory).
Technically, the role of a model theory is to show that there is a consis-
tent interpretation of the proof theory (where the logic is described as be-
ing sound with respect to that interpretation), and perhaps that the logic
completely characterises the model (where the logic is described as being
complete with respect to the model).9
We may wonder whether there is a “natural” logic. Informally at least
we may debate the criteria for what is appropriate, or adequate for captur-
ing human reasoning. The question of whether there is a natural logic may
then be refined into the question of whether there are theory-independent
criteria for judging the correctness of some a logic system (or its interpre-
tation). Evidence from axiomatic geometry suggests that such questions
are non-trivial, and fall outside the realm of logic itself.10
Given the difficulty of formulating objective criteria to identify a “natu-
ral” logic, it is conventional to fall-back on some standard systems. These
8Including the mechanisms for compositionality in the logical framework helps
ensure that all relevant aspects of the compositional analysis have a coherent inter-
pretation in the logical framework. This usually requires the logic to support some
mechanism for performing substitution, such as the λ -calculus.
9There is some potentially confusing use of terminology, where a model is some-
times described as providing the semantics of the logic, a terminology that perhaps
presupposes the model-theoretic view of formal semantics (Section 4).
10The argument can be summarised as follows. We can formalise rules for geome-
try. The rules can be considered to be either descriptive or normative for the intended
system. They satisfy certain notions of consistency, but there is nothing within the
formal theory that allows us to say that some formalisation is objectively “right”, and
another “wrong”, as we can demonstrate that two different, otherwise incompatible
systems of axiomatic geometry are mutually consistent: if one theory is consistent,
then so is the other. In the case of axiomatic geometry this follows from the indepen-
dence of the Euclidean parallel postulate (Beltrami, 1868).
include propositional logic (a logic that can be given a straight-forward
algebraic definition), first-order logic (a logic that is singled out by Lind-
ström’s theorem, and which supports both compactness and the downward
Löwenheim–Skolem theorem), second-order logics (the weakest logics
that are categorial with respect to their models), and Higher Order Logic
(a logic that can be defined in Church-typed λ -calculus). As can be seen,
these “standard” logics can be characterised as formal systems that have,
in some sense, mathematically “interesting” properties. But this does not
necessarily mean they are “natural”, adequate or appropriate for capturing
how we reason with natural language.
Those who attribute a special foundational status to possible worlds
might take them to provide a criteria for characterising a “natural” logic;
one that is sound and complete with respect to a set-theoretic possible
worlds interpretation. On such a view, the logic may be considered to
be an eliminable layer of representation. Theories can then be expressed
directly in terms of a model theory. This can be seen to characterise the
“model theoretic” tradition.
4. Model Theoretic Semantics: a conventional approach
In much of the literature relating to formal semantics, there is a presump-
tion that set-theoretic models are the proper target of formal interpreta-
tion. The received story in the Montagovian tradition is that the process
of giving a formal interpretation involves finding mappings from natural
language to logic, and from logic to a model. Furthermore, this should be
done in such a way that composing the two mappings gives a direct trans-
lation into the model, allowing the logic to be eliminated (see Thomason,
1974, for example).11
The models typically involve possible worlds (or some alternative, such
as context change potential) so that the translation is then from natural
language into possible worlds (or context-change potential). In turn, these
theories are usually expressed in terms of set theory, allowing us to char-
acterise model-theoretic semantics as being, broadly, the translation of
11There is a point of controversy here about whether this was Montague’s own
view. The received view corresponds to the characterisation of Montague semantics
presented by Thomason (1974). But this is not uncontested. Montague (1969) hints
at the idea that the logical is important. This view is also considered by Partee (2013)
and Cocchiarella (1981, 1997) — P.C. Partee, July 2013.
natural language into set theory. We might call this the standard model-
theoretic account.
The model-theoretic approach can be exemplified with the analysis of
propositions, questions and imperatives. Essentially, worlds can be taken
to be sets of propositions, or (equivalently) propositions can be taken to be
sets of worlds. Properties are then sets of world–individual pairs, relations
are sets of pairs mapped to sets, and quantifiers (at least the simpler cases)
are set inclusion and set intersection relationships. Ultimately everything
is then mapped to sets or structures over sets, which can all be reduced to
a “non-representational”, pure set theory.
Questions can be treated as partitions of worlds (Groenendijk and
Stokhof, 1997) corresponding to different answers. Answers then corre-
spond to an identification of a subset of the partition, with appropriate
adjustments to account for propositional vs. non-propositional answers.12
For imperatives, broadly speaking the model-theoretic possible worlds
analysis is given in terms of preference relationships over possible worlds
(see Lascarides and Asher, 2004; Segerberg, 1990, for example). A similar
approach is adopted for possible worlds interpretations of deontic expres-
sions (for example, von Wright, 1951, 1953).
The conventional approach is perhaps motivated in part by the view that
set theory has a foundational status, and that any logical representation
itself can only have meaning if it too is interpreted in set theory. On such
model-theoretic accounts, set theory, and possible worlds, are taken to be
independently “given”, perhaps with a more natural or foundational status
than a logic. The justification might be that this avoids a reliance on some
form of representationalism, for both logic and model theory (as criticised
by Wittgenstein and others).
Arguments could be made that semantic accounts that rely on pre-
existing, independently motivated frameworks, such as set-theoretic possi-
ble worlds, also have some explanatory power. There is a sense in which
the theory can be said to “predict” the relevant semantic behaviour in that
the behaviour is already contained within the theory: the role of our com-
positional analysis is then to show how language can be mapped system-
atically to sets that already have the relevant behaviour.
12One alternative is to interpret questions and answers in terms of abstractions and
structured propositions. Depending on how this is formalised, related ontological
issues can arise, as sketched later in Section 5 (see also Fox, 2013).
In some cases, the translation into set-theory may be somewhat dis-
guised by a narrative that interprets the sets in terms of possible worlds or
context-change potential. Semanticists will also talk of “questions”, “par-
tial states”, “answers“, “propositions”, “worlds” and “states” rather than
just “sets”. But typically there is an implicit assumption of the paradigm
that in their formalisation, such notions can and should ultimately be re-
duced to pure set theory — even in cases where a logic representation is
used.
One downside of this set-theoretic reduction is that the intended inter-
pretation, and the distinctions between different conceptual notions, are
not necessarily evident in the formal theory itself, but instead may be pro-
vided by a narrative, a narrative that is not strictly part of the formalisation.
5. Is the standard approach adequate?
The arguments that might be made for the standard model-theoretic view
can be summarised as follows.
1. It takes a pre-existing “foundational” framework as a starting point.
2. There is no need to “justify” the basic rules of a logic.
3. It avoids representationalism.
4. There is a potential to explain, not just describe
We may question how much weight and credence should be give to such ar-
guments, and whether the standard, set-theoretic possible worlds account
is fundamentally different to any other theory or framework. In brief, is it
right to credit the standard account as being a non-representational theory
with explanatory power?
The standard approach implicitly presumes that all relevant notions can
be reduced to set-theoretic characterisations. We may wonder whether
there are problems in such reductions (Fox and Turner, 2012). Here it
is appropriate to reprise Benacerraf’s dilemma (Benacerraf, 1965). We
can purport to define numbers in set theory by identifying those sets that
capture the relevant properties and patterns of behaviour. But there are
different, equally valid ways of doing this. On the von Neumann account,





That is, “1” is represented by {“0”}, “2” by {“0”,“1”}, and “3” by
{“0”,“1”,“2”}, and so on. The notion of “less than” (<) is then captured
by set membership.
“1 < 3” −→ 1 ∈ 3
With the Church-style analysis, a number is a set containing its prede-





The notion of “less than” (<) is then captured by the transitive closure of
the subset relation.
“1 < 3” −→ 1⊂+ 3
Unfortunately, there are crucial ways in which these set-theoretic char-
acterisations are inappropriate. They have behaviours that go beyond num-
ber theory. For example, the reduction of numbers to set theory means that
statements such as “1 ∈ 3”, and “1 ⊂ 3” can be expressed, even though
they do not reflect any intuitions about numbers. Their truth conditions
are an artefact of the representation rather than numbers as such. Further-
more, these unintended behaviours of “numbers” are different for different
characterisations. Thus set theory fails to provide a faithful, canonical in-
terpretation of numbers. We might argue that in some sense set theory
cannot provide a “transparent” representations of numbers: there are arte-
facts of the behaviour of the representation that allow us to distinguish the
behaviour of the representation from that of the numbers themselves (cf.
Harman, 1990).
The message of Benacerraf’s argument is that set-theoretic characteri-
sations cannot be definitive — there is a disparity between the theory and
the “data”. We may also question whether set-theory alone can ever be
said to “explain” or “describe” numbers, given that we appear to require
a pre-existing structural understanding if we are to make sense of these
set-theoretic characterisations.
Similar concerns about such ontological reductions arise in natural lan-
guage semantics, where on the standard account:
1. questions are partitions of worlds;
2. answers are elements of a partition of worlds; and
3. there is no difference between a question and (the set of) its possible
answers.
This is in addition to technical issues with the standard account. To pick
a couple of examples: propositions have insufficiently fine-grained in-
tensionality; and some of the deontic and imperative “paradoxes”, such
as Chisholm’s “contrary-to-duty” obligations (Chisholm, 1963) appear in
part to be due to unintended consequences of the conventional possible-
worlds interpretations. Effort has to be spent addressing issues that arise
as an unintended consequence of reducing everything to a set-theoretic
possible worlds analysis.
As noted in the introduction, some of the problematic issues concerning
a reductive analysis of meaning are not confined to set-theoretic models.
For example, some use λ -abstracts for questions (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000;
Hausser, 1983; Hausser and Zaefferer, 1979; von Stechow and Zimmer-
mann, 1984). There is then a potential ontological difficulty in that within
the formalisation, questions are indistinguishable from other λ -abstracts.
Others have proposed using λ -abstracts and pairs for structured proposi-
tions (von Stechow, 1982; Krifka, 2001). Again, there is a potential on-
tological problem here in that such pairings are not distinguishable from
other pairings involving λ -abstracts.
Some of the methodological and ontological concerns about reducing
meaning to set-theory, or λ -calculus, may also apply to accounts that
adopt other pre-existing and “independently motivated” frameworks, such
as constructive type theory, depending on how the interpretation is formu-
lated.
Returning to the question of data, in general formal semanticists are con-
cerned about capturing intuitions about linguistic behaviour, both in isola-
tion and in context. The data is is messy, and we are obliged to consider
abstractions. Even when resorting to corpus studies of spontaneous lan-
guage use, or to psycho-linguistic experiments — perhaps to avoid some
of the limitations of personal intuitions and introspection — there is the
unavoidable issue of abstraction and interpretation. It seems impossible to
consider abstractions without some form of ontological framework with
appropriate structural relations and patterns: the nature of our abstractions,
and our characterisations of the data, invariably appeals to ontological in-
tuitions (cf. Dummett, 1991).
Ultimately, it seems clear that characterisations of semantic theory
within the standard account cannot be taken to define the various notions
to which we appeal. Any narrative, and an appropriate intermediate repre-
sentation, ought to be considered an essential part of the theory, providing
a representation that is faithful to the intended interpretation. What we
could argue is that, given a choice, it would be better if the ontological
presumptions and intuitions of the narrative were considered an intrinsic
part of our semantic analysis, and were subject to the same formal rigour
(cf. Feferman, 1992).
6. An Alternative Approach
An alternative to the reductive model-theoretic approach is to adopt a
clean, minimal meta-theory. We can then seek to formalise ontological
intuitions non-reductively within this framework, and then go on to for-
malise meaning in terms of these ontological notions. Essentially this is a
proposal to accept and embrace some form of representationalism (and
structuralism). An example of a clean, minimal meta-theory is Typed
Predicate Logic (TPL, Turner, 2008, 2009). This theory has four basic
judgements.
1. T Type (T is a type)
2. t : T (t belongs to type T )
3. p Prop (p is a proposition)
4. p True (p is (a) true (proposition))
These appear in sequents of the form
Γ `Φ
This represents the claim that judgementΦ follows in the context of judge-
ments Γ. All of the syntactic and logical behaviour of a representation
language can be expressed by way of sequent rules of the following form:
Γ1 `Φ1 Γ2 `Φ2 . . . Γn `Φn
Γ `Φ
This says that Γ `Φ follows from the premises Γi `Φi (for 1≤ i≤ n).
In effect we can formulate semantics and grammar in the same system.
We also treat the logic as a first class notion that does not require a set-
theoretic model to give it meaning above and beyond what is intended in
the narrative. We first exemplify the use of TPL by sketching rules for for-
mation (F), introduction (+) and elimination (−) for propositional logic’s
conjunction (∧) and universal quantification (∀). The formation rules ef-
fectively define the syntax of the expressions, and their logical behaviour
is characterised by way of the introduction and elimination rules. Here we
highlight some of the salient expressions in the object language as an aid
to readers who are not very familiar with these kinds of rules.13
Conjunction:
Γ ` p Prop Γ ` q Prop
Γ ` p ∧ q Prop ∧ F
Γ ` p True Γ ` q True
Γ ` p ∧ q True ∧+
Γ ` p ∧ q True
Γ ` p True ∧ −
Universal quantification:
Γ,x : T ` p Prop
Γ ` ∀xεT · p Prop ∀F
Γ,x : T ` t True
Γ ` ∀xεT · t True ∀+
Γ ` ∀xεT · t True Γ ` s : T
Γ ` t[s/x] True ∀−
Although there is not space to elaborate on this point, it is pertinent to
observe that formulating a logic in this framework allows us to develop a
fine grained analysis of intensionality without possible worlds (see Turner,
2005, for example). We may still need a model for this logic, which might
be formulated in set theory, but its role is only to assist in proofs of its
consistency.
We can also sketch a theory of questions in this framework. Questions
can be taken to be expressions of the form “[xεT | φ ]” where x corresponds
to the “missing” component identified by a wh-clause, T is its type, and φ
is the body of the question, as in the clause “is running” in the question
13Note that all the formalisations as presented here are intended merely to illustrate
the approach; they do not by themselves constitute fully-fledged semantic theories.
“who is running?”. Here is a formation rule for question types.
Γ ` T Type
Question(T ) Type
The formation rule for the representation of questions themselves would
then be something like:
Γ,x : T ` φ Prop
Γ ` [xεT | φ ] : Question(T )
Answers can be analysed in terms of structured propositions, represented
by “〈 f | t〉”, where f is the part of the term that is in focus, and t is the
topic (following the approach of Krifka, 2001). For example, an answer to
the question “who is running” might be “John is running”, where “John”
is the focus, and “is running” is the topic. This would be represented by
something akin to “〈John | λx.x is running〉”. The syntax of an answer-
hood relation can be governed by the following rule.
Γ,x : T ` φ Prop Γ ` a : T
Γ ` 〈a | λx.φ〉 ans [xεT | φ ] Prop
We have a true answer when “〈a | λx.φ〉 ans [xεT | φ ]” is a well-formed
proposition and “φ [a/x]” is true. For our example,
〈John | λx.x is running〉 ans [xεT | x is running]
would be a proposition, if “John” is of type B, and it would be a true an-
swer if John were indeed running. As can be seen, there is no reduction to
set-theoretic possible worlds, and our representation of questions and an-
swers can be specific to those categories For a more complete presentation
along these lines see Fox (2013).
In the case of imperatives, we can state rules governing the judgement
that something is an imperative, and that an imperative has been satisfied.
The notions of being an imperative, and being satisfied (“fulfilled”, or
“complied with”) can be formulated as judgements or types. Here are two
candidate rules governing the formation of disjunctive imperatives and
their satisfaction conditions (where a and b are imperatives).
Γ ` a Imperative Γ ` b Imperative
Γ ` a ∨ b Imperative ∨ F
Γ ` a Satisfied Γ ` b unSatisfied
Γ ` a ∨ b Satisfied ∨+
To give an example, the first rule says that “Watch television or go to the
beach!” is an imperative if both disjuncts are imperatives. The second
rules says that the disjoined imperative is deemed satisfied in the even
that the first disjunct is satisfied, and the second is unsatisfied; that is, the
subject is watching television and has not gone to the beach.
The framework allows us to concentrate on our intuitions rather than
the problem of formalising a set-theoretic possible worlds characterisation,
and dealing with any unintended consequences.
The flexible approach to judgements in TPL allows us to consider our in-
tuitions about hybrid expressions, such as so-called “pseudo imperatives”
(Franke, 2005a,b). The following rules show how we can type an expres-
sion of the form “a∧ p”, where “a” is an imperative and “p” a proposition
(as in “Take another step and I will shoot”, or “Have another beer and
you will be happy”), and “a ∨ p” (as in “Stand still or I’ll shoot!”). Both
the conjunctive and disjunctive forms combine a proposition with an im-
perative. Arguably, in the conjunctive case the result is a proposition ex-
pressing a threat or promise. In the disjunctive case there could be said to
be both imperative and propositional content, where the latter expresses a
salient alternative in the event of non-compliance with the imperative con-
tent. Within TPL, the typing for these hybrid expressions can be captured
by rules of the following form.
Γ ` a Imperative Γ ` p Prop
Γ ` a ∧ p Prop
Γ ` a Imperative Γ ` p Prop
Γ ` a ∨ p Prop
Γ ` a Imperative Γ ` p Prop
Γ ` a ∨ p Imperative
Unlike standard type theory, expressions can belong to more than one type.
Arguably, detaching the formal analysis and characterisation from a re-
ductive model-theoretic framework makes it more straight-forward to con-
sider incoherent commands, as their representation in the framework need
not result in an inconsistency within the semantic theory itself. See Fox
(2012a) for a more complete formalisation of imperatives along these lines.
A theory of deontic logic within TPL is also outlined by Fox (2012b).
7. Explanation and Description
As mentioned in Section 4, one argument that is sometimes made (infor-
mally at least) is that model-theoretic approaches that work with a pre-
existing, independently motivated theory offer some kind of explanation.
In contrast, a more bespoke, axiomatic approach might be characterised
as merely describing the data in a different form. A counter-argument is
that reductive model-theoretic accounts require us to identify and circum-
scribe the relevant behaviour, and that they too must assume that we have
some characterisation of the behaviour we wish to circumscribe that is in-
dependent of its model theoretic interpretation. There is often an appeal
to these intuitions in the description of the intended meaning of the model-
theoretic analysis. It is not then clear what any supposed “explanatory
power” of the formal theory then amounts to if informal narrative, and
structural insights, are still required to make sense of the theory.14
It might be argued that a set-theoretic approach to formalising seman-
tics, and the way in which ontological distinctions are removed, allows us
to find a unifying analysis when faced with cross-categorial phenomena,
such as disjunction. But in principle there is nothing to prevent us consid-
ering more abstract characterisations of such notions outside set-theory by
identifying and formalising generic, overarching patterns of behaviour.
In any case, given that we need narrative to characterise intended inter-
pretations, and that we are interested in rigorous formal analyses, then it
seems appropriate to formalise the insights of that narrative.
It might not be entirely clear what the “data” is, or whether and in what
sense a formal analysis of meaning is a scientific theory, given the diffi-
culty in determining an objective criteria for “correctness” of all aspects
of the analysis. But such formalisation does at least allow us to check
coherence of insights, and attempts to “explain” meaning in terms of on-
tological assumptions.
14This is not to say that, for example, a possible worlds perspective is inappropriate;
some useful insights can be obtained by considering how a problem might be framed
in terms of possible worlds.
8. Conclusions
Semantics is concerned with characterising aspects of meaning. As with
any intellectual endeavour, it is natural to presuppose a framework of on-
tological notions and classifications in which to express abstractions and
generalisations about the behaviour of language.
Formal semantics is in essence concerned with characterising behaviour
with unambiguous rules. But such formalisation also relies upon a frame-
work of ontological notions and characterisations. In model-theoretic se-
mantics, these may only be evident in the narrative that accompanies the
formalisation.
The view being put forward here is that such substantive narrative is
part of the semantic theory, and as such it too should be subject to the same
rigour. In brief, ontological insights are important. We might even go so
far as to to say that they may constitute a core theoretical contribution of
formal semantics.
Other arguments can be made, of course. Ultimately, it seems there will
always be subtle aspects of meaning that are inevitably lost by our clumsy
attempts at formalisation. In selecting patterns of behaviour and intuitions
that we are able to capture, we cannot help but ignore other aspects of
meaning.15
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